Suchergebnisse

In all three chapters of this dissertation, I try to see whether discrimination and own-group preferences exist, in different contexts, and what kind of public policies could mitigate or balance the negative effect of these preferences. In my first chapter, I rely on a famous ruling that changed the monopsony power of firms to see whether, as predicted by Becker, market failures have an impact on wage discrimination. I find that as monopsony power decreases, firms are no longer able to act on their prejudice, and wage discrimination disappears. This result shows that labour market context is essential in evaluating public policies, and that prejudice need not necessarily translate into wage discrimination. In the second chapter, I analyse the effect of another public policy, a 2015 reform that imposed gender quotas in academic recruitment committees. The reasoning of the policymakers was that increasing the share of women evaluators would improve the outcomes for women. I find the opposite instead; women are ranked worse by hiring committees after the reform. However, this result does not show that women discriminate against women. There is some evidence that this result is caused by the reaction of male jurors to the reform, since the negative effect of the reform is found only in committees that are helmed by male jury presidents. This chapter shows that it is necessary to evaluate public policies, lest reforms that are well-meaning in intention turn out to cause more harm than good. In the third and final chapter, I show two stylised facts: When cities decline, they tend to become more black, and black residents are disproportionately located in cities that pay low wages. One explanation for this could be that living in cities with a larger share of black residents is a positive amenity for black workers. I try to see whether workers have preferences for living in cities that have a larger share of co-ethnic residents, when controlling for wages, rents, transfers and network amenities. I find that these ...

International audience ; Following in the footsteps of similar initiatives at the boardroom level in Norway and other European countries, the French government decided to impose a gender quota in academic hiring committees in 2015. The goal of this paper is to evaluate how this reform changed the way women are ranked by these committees. The reform affected academic disciplines heterogeneously. I contrast the effect of the reform between fields that were significantly affected, and those that already respected the quota before the reform. Drawing on a unique dataset made up of administrative data provided by French universities, I show that the reform significantly worsened both the probability of being hired and the ranks of women, with a treatment effect equivalent to a 4 standard deviation drop in h-index. There is evidence that this is driven mainly by the reaction of men to the reform, since the negative effect of the reform is concentrated in committees that are helmed by men.

In all three chapters of this dissertation, I try to see whether discrimination and own-group preferences exist, in different contexts, and what kind of public policies could mitigate or balance the negative effect of these preferences. In my first chapter, I rely on a famous ruling that changed the monopsony power of firms to see whether, as predicted by Becker, market failures have an impact on wage discrimination. I find that as monopsony power decreases, firms are no longer able to act on their prejudice, and wage discrimination disappears. This result shows that labour market context is essential in evaluating public policies, and that prejudice need not necessarily translate into wage discrimination. In the second chapter, I analyse the effect of another public policy, a 2015 reform that imposed gender quotas in academic recruitment committees. The reasoning of the policymakers was that increasing the share of women evaluators would improve the outcomes for women. I find the opposite instead; women are ranked worse by hiring committees after the reform. However, this result does not show that women discriminate against women. There is some evidence that this result is caused by the reaction of male jurors to the reform, since the negative effect of the reform is found only in committees that are helmed by male jury presidents. This chapter shows that it is necessary to evaluate public policies, lest reforms that are well-meaning in intention turn out to cause more harm than good. In the third and final chapter, I show two stylised facts: When cities decline, they tend to become more black, and black residents are disproportionately located in cities that pay low wages. One explanation for this could be that living in cities with a larger share of black residents is a positive amenity for black workers. I try to see whether workers have preferences for living in cities that have a larger share of co-ethnic residents, when controlling for wages, rents, transfers and network amenities. I find that these preferences are significant, and then try to see what share of the wage gap these preferences, and the imperfect sorting they imply, could explain. ; Dans les trois chapitres de cette thèse, j'étudie l'effet des préjugés et des préférences discriminatoires sur le marché du travail. Je m'intéresse aussi à l'efficacité de politiques publiques qui ont pour objectif d'atténuer les effets négatifs de ces préférences. Dans mon premier chapitre, je m'appuie sur un arrêt célèbre qui a changé le pouvoir de monopsone des entreprises pour voir si, comme l'avait prédit Becker, les défaillances du marché ont un impact sur la discrimination salariale. Mes résultats montrent que lorsque le pouvoir de monopsone diminue, la discrimination salariale disparaît. Ce résultat montre que les préjugés ne doivent pas nécessairement se traduire par une discrimination salariale. Dans le deuxième chapitre, j'analyse l'effet d'une autre politique publique, une réforme de 2015 qui a imposé des quotas de genre dans les comités de sélection académique en France. L'objectif de cette réforme était d'améliorer les classements des femmes en augmentant la part des celles-ci dans les comités. En évaluant la réforme, je trouve l'effet inverse ; les femmes sont moins bien classées par les comités de recrutement après la réforme. Cependant, ce résultat ne montre pas que les femmes ont une préférence pour les hommes. L'effet négatif de la réforme ne se trouve que dans les commissions dirigées par des présidents de jury masculins, ce qui suggère que le comportement des hommes a peut-être lui aussi changé suite à la réforme. Ce chapitre démontre qu'il est nécessaire d'évaluer les politiques publiques, afin d'éviter que des réformes bien intentionnées ne causent plus de mal que de bien. Dans le troisième et dernier chapitre, je m'intéresse aux choix de localisation des individus. Je m'intéresse tout particulièrement à la question suivante : Les travailleurs préfèrent-ils habiter dans une ville avec une proportion plus importante de résidents du même groupe ethnique qu'eux, ceteris paribus ? J'utilise un modèle d'équilibre spatial qui permet de répondre à cette question. En contrôlant pour les salaires, les loyers, les revenus de transfert et les réseaux des individus, ces préférences sont comparables aux salaires réels dans les choix de localisation des villes des individus. Je simule ensuite le modèle pour essayer de voir quel est l'impact de ces préférences sur les écarts de salaires entre travailleurs blancs et noirs aux États-Unis.

Following in the footsteps of similar initiatives at the boardroom level in Norway and other European countries, the French government decided to impose a gender quota in academic hiring committees in 2015. The goal of this paper is to evaluate how this reform changed the way women are ranked by these committees. The reform affected academic disciplines heterogeneously. I contrast the effect of the reform between fields that were significantly affected, and those that already respected the quota before the reform. Drawing on a unique dataset made up of administrative data provided by French universities, I show that the reform significantly worsened both the probability of being hired and the ranks of women, with a treatment effect equivalent to a 4 standard deviation drop in h-index. There is evidence that this is driven mainly by the reaction of men to the reform, since the negative effect of the reform is concentrated in committees that are helmed by men.